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Company Paternalism and the
Hidden-Investment Process:
Identification of the “Right Type” for Line
Managers in Leading Japanese Organizations
Mary Uhl-Bien, Pamela S. Tierney, George B. Graen
University of Cincinnati

Mitsuru Wakabayashi
Nagoya University
Abstract
This study investigates belief in company paternalism as an indicator of the “right
type” for line managers in leading Japanese corporations. In five companies, 1,075
line managers were surveyed about their belief in company paternalism, their experience with both the formal and informal career-development systems within
their company, their working relationships with their immediate superior (LMX),
and their overall job satisfaction. Results indicated that belief in company paternalism contributed as hypothesized to formal career investments, informal career
investments (including both self-investment and supervisor investment), LMX,
and overall job satisfaction. These relationships held true both before and after
experiences with the formal career-development system were controlled. Implications of right type for American organizations are discussed.

An

investigation of Japanese management development conducted
by Graen and colleagues (Graen, Wakabayashi, Graen, & Graen, 1990;
Wakabayashi, 1980; Wakabayashi & Graen, 1984; Wakabayashi, Graen,
Graen, & Graen, 1988; Wakabayashi et al., 1980) spanning 13 years of
Japanese line managers’ career progress from organizational entry to
The authors wish to thank Joan Graen, Mike Graen, Marty Graen, and M. Sano for their research assistance and the Fulbright Commission, Nagoya University, and the University of
Cincinnati for support on this project.
Corresponding author — Mary Uhl-Bien

414

Company Paternalism

and the

H i d d e n -I n v e s t m e n t P r o c e s s

415

advancement into middle management has provided new insight into
career progress within Japanese management systems. For example, in
contrast to previous speculation that Japanese management progress is
“lock-step,” it was determined that Japanese line managers, analogous
to their Western counterparts, experience differentiation in career progress throughout their careers (Wakabayashi et al., 1988; Wakabayashi,
Graen, & Uhl-Bien, 1990). This differentiation occurs through a process
of “hidden investments” (Graen, 1989). According to this career-progress model, managers who eventually vie for the executive suite are
identified early in their careers and prepared for their entry into the upper echelons through hidden investments that occur throughout their
careers (Wakabayashi et al., 1990).
As demonstrated in the 13-year cohort study and in subsequent
studies investigating Japanese career progress (Wakabayashi & Graen,
1984; Wakabayashi et al., 1988; Wakabayashi et al., 1990), however, not
all Japanese line managers are able to receive the career investments
that put them on the fast track in terms of career progress. Rather, it
was found that a key contributor to attainment of the fast track in Japanese organizations is the Japanese line managers’ success in developing
high-quality leadership relationships with their supervisors. These relationships influence attainment of the fast track through increased career
investments that line managers involved in the relationships receive. In
particular, by becoming involved in high-quality leadership relationships, line managers receive the types of increased career investments
from their supervisors that have been found to be positively related
to career progress within Japanese systems (Wakabayashi et al., 1988;
Wakabayashi et al., 1990).
Given the importance of establishing high-quality leader-member relationships and attaining hidden investments in one’s career for entry to
the fast track, the question of interest that arises is, What types of individuals in Japanese organizations are most likely to develop high-quality
LMX relationships successfully and thus receive increased investments in
their careers ? In other words, is there some personal characteristic that
gives its possessor a competitive advantage in terms of career progress
within Japanese corporations? If so, the identification of this personal
characteristic would provide insight into what type of individual is able
to advance successfully within the Japanese management hierarchy.
Thus the purpose of the present study is to investigate what constitutes the right type of worker for the Japanese management system. In
order to understand better how career progress occurs within Japanese
management systems, however, we turn next to a discussion of the characteristics of career-development systems within Japanese organizations.
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Career Investments
As in most organizations, career development in Japanese corporations is contingent upon the types of career investments the developing managers receive (Yoshino, 1968). These career investments are
growth opportunities bestowed upon organizational members to help
them learn and develop on the job. Individuals who receive greater career investments are generally better trained and better prepared to accept the responsibilities that come with advancement through the organizational hierarchy. In Japanese organizations, career investments occur
on two levels: formal career investment, carried out by the company career-development system, and informal career investments, conducted
through a process of hidden investments (Graen, 1989). Formal career investments, which involve programming formal career-development activities for each organizational member, are managed by the personnel
departments in these organizations. Informal career investments, on the
other hand, are conducted at the discretion of individual organizational
members and others around them who may take an interest in their career development.
Formal Career-Development System
The formal career-development system in Japanese organizations is
quite different from that of the leading American corporations. In contrast to American systems in which the personnel department plays a reduced role in the promotion and development activities of organizational
members, personnel departments in Japanese organizations play a central role in the career planning of their line managers. In particular, Japanese personnel departments are largely responsible for monitoring the
career-development activities of each organizational member and determining the career paths that these individuals will take.
As part of this process, personnel sections, not departmental supervisors, take responsibility for administering the periodic performance
evaluations by which employee career progress is monitored. In addition, the personnel section identifies the training requirements of each
employee based on the individual experiences and needs of the employee. From this information, members of the personnel department,
acting as representatives of the formal career-development system, determine the promotability of each employee and then program career
paths for each organizational member based on a standard schedule
modified for individual needs. By defining which career path individual managers will follow, the company career-development system may
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play a significant role in establishing the career progress of each organizational member.
Informal “Hidden-Investment” Career-Development System
Along with investments made by the formal career-development system within the organization, career investments may also occur on an
informal level through a process of hidden investments (Wakabayashi
et al., 1988). Hidden investments represent special growth opportunities for certain individuals. These investments may originate from several sources, but their primary source is the high-quality exchange relationship (LMX) between the focal manager and his immediate supervisor
(Wakabayashi et al., 1990).
As part of the high-quality leader-member exchange (LMX) relationship, supervisors invest more of their own valuable resources in the careers of the selected subordinates (Graen & Scandura, 1987; Graen, 1989).
Through this investment, high-quality LMX subordinates are given
greater opportunities to develop in their jobs. For example, supervisor investment in a high-LMX subordinate may involve providing the subordinate with special attention and support, offering the subordinate inside
information about the organization, delegating extra influence and authority to the subordinate, offering the subordinate latitude in the performance of his job, providing the subordinate extra access to departmental
resources, and allowing the subordinate to participate in critical assignments (Wakabayashi et al., 1990). As a result of these investment processes, high-quality subordinates become well-trained, trusted assistants,
upon whom the supervisor may rely for assistance. For the developing
line managers, these increased investments offer growth opportunities
that are often essential for career progress within the organization.
In addition to supervisor investment, informal hidden-investment
processes also include self-investment activities performed by the individual managers (Wakabayashi et al., 1990). These self-investment activities occur when individuals in organizations agree to grow out of their
formal jobs through the acceptance of additional responsibilities not
specified in their formal job descriptions (Graen, 1989; Graen & Wakabayashi, in press). Potential self-investment behaviors may include activities such as increasing technical expertise by performing new tasks,
expanding one’s competence network, taking risks on the job, building
exchange relationships with coworkers, searching for new opportunities
for self-improvement, and generally managing one’s own career. In addition, line managers may become proactive in their career progress by
working to develop high-quality relationships with their supervisors and
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thus gain access to the valuable resources discussed earlier (Graen, 1989;
Wakabayashi et al., 1990).
When taken in combination, supervisor and self hidden-investment
processes are extremely beneficial to the manager receiving the investment, the supervisor, and the organization as a whole. Organizational
members who receive career investments benefit from increased opportunity for advancement within the organization, whereas the supervisor
and the organization benefit by employing a well-trained, highly dependable worker. Moreover, these activities may be complementary, in that
self-investment activities may result in development of higher LMX relationships and, subsequently, increased supervisor investment in the developing manager. In addition to increased informal career investments,
individuals participating in hidden-investment activities may also indirectly influence formal career investments through the high-potential image these activities reflect.
Although both types of career-development systems are influential in
career progress, they differ in the amount of control they permit to developing managers. In contrast to formal career-development systems, in
which career investments are regulated through highly structured systems, informal hidden-investment processes offer developing managers
much greater opportunities for self-control over career progress. Indeed,
hidden investments require line managers to take an active stance, because these investments do not come unless managers are willing to engage in self-investment activities and grow out of their jobs. In addition,
any influence managers may sustain over the formal career-development
system would likely be gained through hidden-investment activities in
which they participate. Hence, in contrast to formal career-development systems, hidden investments allow managers a vehicle with which
they can take a proactive role in career development. Consequently, it is
through the hidden-investment process that right types of line managers would be expected to differentiate themselves from their less qualified co-workers.
Thus career-development systems in Japanese organizations may affect a line manager’s career progress in two ways: through a more formalized public face career-development system, in which the company
programs formal career-development activities for each line manager, or
through a more informal hidden-investment system, in which line managers (through their supervisors) engage in career-development activities
by growing out of their formal job descriptions. In the next section, these
two types of career-development systems will be discussed in terms of
their implications for identification of the right type of worker for the Japanese management system.
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Company Paternalism
As discussed above, both formal and informal career-development
systems have an impact on Japanese line managers’ career progress. Although we have a general understanding of how these processes operate, however, it is still unclear which individual characteristics determine whether a line manager within this Japanese system will be
successful in advancing through the Japanese management hierarchy.
In the following paragraphs, one possible individual attribute of the
right type of Japanese worker, belief in company paternalism, will be
presented and discussed.
Japanese management systems have been described in many ways: in
terms of lifetime employment and commitment, company loyalty, mutual trust, cooperation and conformity, familial management, and group
harmony (Alston, 1989; Befu, 1980; Ouchi, 1981). Although it is difficult
to select just one of these characteristics as being more important to the
effectiveness of the system than another, it is possible to identify one
characteristic of the system from which most of the others emerge: the
belief in company paternalism. The mutual belief among Japanese managers and workers that the relationship between the company and employee is paternalistic in nature fosters many of the other characteristics
described above: trust among workers and managers, cooperation and
harmony throughout the organization (because everyone works together
for the good of the whole), lifetime employment and commitment (because a family member is a family member for life), and so on. Because
company paternalism is central to the effective functioning of the Japanese system, it would follow that attitudes toward company paternalism
held by workers would play a significant role in determining the compatibility of the workers with the management system.
Based on this, one reasonable candidate for a right type of worker for
the Japanese management system would likely be someone with strong
beliefs in company paternalism (Abegglen, 1957; Befu, 1980; Marsh &
Mannari, 1971; Ouchi, 1981). Such employees would place their trust, loyalty, and indeed, their careers, in the hands of the company. They would
place the interests of their company above their own and take a careerlong perspective on their treatment by the company. Even when temporarily disadvantaged in their career progress, they would believe that
their commitment would be rewarded in the future. Conversely, individuals with weak beliefs in company paternalism, who represent a “nonright type,” would feel that their relationship with the company is primarily economic and contractual and thus would not be willing to make
the extra commitment to the organization made by their high-paternalism (Hi-Pat) counterparts.
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It is important to note here that this conception of belief in company
paternalism differs from the American view of paternalism. In contrast
to Americans, who typically perceive the concept negatively, the Japanese place a very positive value on company paternalism. Americans
often perceive company paternalism as making them dependent upon
and subservient to the company. Among Japanese workers, however,
belief in putting one’s fate in the hands of the company and relating
to the company as the head of one’s extended family has a very positive connotation. Company housing, country clubs, paid vacations, and
other benefits are seen as earned by employees rather than as gifts to
retainers. Indeed, policies of lifetime employment, career-long training and development, and company paternalism have been hallmarks
of the leading Japanese corporations since the 1950s (Abegglen, 1957;
Sethi, Namiki, & Swanson, 1984) and have been maintained with very
few exceptions since that time.
This success of Japanese corporations in promoting paternalistic
feelings throughout their work force suggests that paternalism may
be a key factor in identifying those individuals who are more compatible with these types of systems. For example, because those who have
a strong belief in company paternalism place the interests of the company above their own and take a career-long perspective of their treatment by the company, it would follow that these individuals would
demonstrate more commitment to the welfare of the company. These
“high-paternals” (Hi-Pats) would thus be more likely to invest more of
themselves in the company. One way in which they may demonstrate
their increased commitment to the organization would be by agreeing
to take on additional responsibilities outside of their formal job descriptions. In other words, because they are more committed to the organization, these individuals would be more likely to do more than they
are formally required because they are concerned about the welfare of
the organization. According to the hidden-investment process as described above, these individuals, by agreeing to take on additional responsibilities, would thus be engaging in greater self-investment activities in their career. In addition, by agreeing to grow out of their jobs, the
Hi-Pats would also be more likely to receive greater supervisor investment in their careers. Hence, in terms of hidden career investment, it
would appear that Hi-Pat line managers would be more likely to be involved in the hidden-investment process within Japanese corporations
than would Lo-Pat line managers.
In addition to implications for the informal Japanese career-development system, belief in company paternalism may also have implications
for the formal Japanese career-development system. Because Hi-Pat in-
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dividuals are demonstrating greater commitment to the organization by
taking on additional responsibilities, it is likely that these individuals
would be recognized by the formal career-development system as highpotential employees. As such, Hi-Pat employees would be more likely to
receive more favorable treatment from the formal career-development
system, and thus once again have a competitive advantage in terms of career progress over their Lo-Pat counterparts.
It appears, then, that belief in company paternalism may have significant implications for our understanding of the “right types” of individuals for Japanese organizations. Specifically, belief in company paternalism
may act as an indicant of those individuals who will be more successful
in attaining increased career investments and thus advancing more rapidly and to higher levels in the Japanese hierarchy.
The Right Type of Worker for Japanese Management Systems
Because of the roles formal and informal investments play in influencing career progress within Japanese organizations (Alston, 1989; Wakabayashi et al., in press), examination of the types of individuals who
benefit more greatly from these investments would provide an indication
of the right type of worker for Japanese management systems. In other
words, those individuals who are the right type for Japanese management systems appear to be the individuals who are better able to gain increased investments (formal and informal) in their careers, because these
investments have been demonstrated to have a positive effect on subsequent career progress within Japanese organizations (Wakabayashi et al.,
1990). Moreover, because the informal career-development system allows
individual workers more self-control over their career progress, any differentiation between right types and non-right types would more likely
be revealed in the informal hidden-investment system rather than in the
formal career-development system.
As discussed, Hi-Pat workers appears to fit this description of right
types of workers. Because Hi-Pats are more highly committed to the organization, they can be expected to invest more of themselves in the organization in an unselfish manner. These individuals internalize the
goals and values of the organization and are interested in enhancing their
career progress within the company. Because of this, Hi-Pat employees
would be more likely to take a more proactive role in their career-development activities than would their less paternalistic co-workers. In particular, Hi-Pat workers would be expected to engage in more self-investment activities on the job and, subsequently, to develop higher-quality
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exchange relationships with their supervisors than their Lo-Pat counterparts. These individuals would then become the high-LMX subordinates
in whom the supervisor would place greater career investments. In addition, because of their greater participation in hidden-investment activities, Hi-Pat line managers would be more likely to report receiving more
favorable treatment by the formal career-development system. Moreover, because Hi-Pat line managers would receive enhanced career-development opportunities both formally and informally, these individuals would also be more likely to feel more satisfied in their jobs than their
less paternalistic co-workers.
Based on the preceding discussion, several hypotheses for the present
investigation may be proposed:
Hypothesis 1: Belief in company paternalism will be positively related to selfinvestment activities among Japanese line managers.
Hypothesis 2: Belief in company paternalism will be positively related to hidden career investments from supervisors in Japanese organizations.
Hypothesis 3: Belief in company paternalism will be positively related to
quality of leader-member relationships that are developed among line
managers and their supervisors in Japanese organizations.
Hypothesis 4: Belief in company paternalism will be positively related to evaluations of the formal career-development system provided by line managers in Japanese organizations.
Hypothesis 5: Belief in company paternalism will be positively related to job
satisfaction among line managers in Japanese organizations.

The above hypotheses address the main effects of paternalism on career-development activities within an overall model of career development. However, in order to test for the direct effect of paternalism on the
hidden-investment process—a process that is expected to play a primary
role in the differentiation of the right from the non-right types—it is necessary to test for the contribution of belief in paternalism to hidden-investment activities after the effects of the formal career-development system have been removed. Specifically, regardless of the line manager’s
perceptions of the favorability of the formal career-development system,
belief in paternalism would be expected to be positively related to hidden career investments. Thus:
Hypothesis 6: The contribution of belief in company paternalism to informal
investment processes will exist even after the effects of the evaluation of
the formal career-development system are removed.
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Method
Site and Sample
The sample used for the present study consisted of 1,075 line managers working in five of the leading corporations in Japan.1 Three
of the corporations are manufacturing firms, and two are in the service industry. To control for possible company effects, the data were
standardized within each company before analyses were conducted.
Within the companies, data were collected from managers at various
stages of career development: 261 management trainees, 417 lowerlevel managers, 146 lower-middle managers, and 251 middle managers. The average age of the respondents was 39 years, and over 64% of
the respondents had at least one university degree. The response rate
for the study was 78.2%.
Measures
Predictor measure. Belief in company paternalism was assessed using
a 5-item forced-choice measure developed for this study. This measure
asked the line managers to indicate on a 5-point scale (from strongly
prefer A to strongly prefer B) the extent to which they agreed with statements that described extreme levels of paternalistic and nonpaternalistic attitudes. The items addressed issues concerning the extent to which
the relationship between the employee and the company was “like family” or “basically economic and contractual,” the degree of loyalty between the company and the worker, the extent to which hard work for a
lifetime is performed by the worker because the worker “loves the company” or because of “economic reasons,” the amount of responsibility
the company has for enhancing the well-being of the employee and his
family, and the degree to which the employee is responsible for remaining with the company for a lifetime of employment. The Cronbach alpha for this measure is .70.
Criterion measures. To test the hypotheses concerning paternalism and
the right type for Japanese organizations, several criterion measures were
used. These measures provide evaluations of the formal career-development system (CDS), the informal career-development system that is conducted through hidden investments, the quality of the LMX, and job
satisfaction. The measures used to operationalize these variables are presented in the following paragraphs.
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Evaluation of the formal career-development system in the organization was assessed by the Career-Development System (CDS) measure.
This measure contains 10 sets of bipolar adjectives asking line managers
to rate (on a 7-point scale) the extent to which they would choose one adjective over the other to describe the career-development system of the
organization. Items included in this measure evaluate employee perceptions of the effectiveness and usefulness of the company career-development system. The Cronbach alpha for this measure is .90.
To evaluate informal career-investment processes, two measures of
hidden investments, Supervisor Investment and Self-Investment Activities Inventory, were used. Supervisor Investment is a 22-item measure
developed by Wakabayashi and Graen (Wakabayashi et al., 1990) that
asks respondents to rate the extent to which supervisors engage in behaviors that characterize investment activities. Respondents indicated on
a 5-point scale ranging from rarely to very often how often their supervisor
engages in activities such as allowing subordinates to become involved
in decision making, providing subordinates with special insider information, advising the subordinate on long-range career planning, exposing
subordinates to other departments’ functions within the organization, introducing subordinates to others who may be influential in their career
progress, and involving subordinates in special assignments. The Cronbach alpha for this measure is .95.
The Self-Investment Activities Inventory is a 19-item measure (Wakabayashi et al., 1990) that assesses how active employees are in contributing to their own career development. Items included in this measure
evaluate the extent to which the employee takes part in various activities that have been demonstrated to enhance one’s promotability (Graen,
1989), such as growing out of one’s job, taking on added responsibilities,
exercising leadership, relationship building, risk taking, and demonstrating initiative. The Cronbach alpha for this measure is .92.
Leader-member exchange was measured using the 14-item LMX developed by Graen and colleagues (Graen & Scandura, 1987). This measure assesses the quality of the relationship between individuals and their
immediate supervisors (Graen, Novak, & Sommerkamp, 1982; Graen &
Scandura, 1987). The Cronbach alpha for this measure is .89.
Finally, job satisfaction was measured using three items from the Hoppock Job Satisfaction Scale (Hoppock, 1935). These items ask respondents
to indicate the extent to which they like their job, how often they feel satisfied with their job, and how their job satisfaction compares with that of
other people. The Cronbach alpha for this measure is .78.

Company Paternalism

and the

H i d d e n -I n v e s t m e n t P r o c e s s

425

Analysis
To test the hypotheses, a two-step analysis was undertaken. In the
first step, a correlational analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between belief in company paternalism and the criterion
variables. The results of this analysis were used to test Hypotheses 1
through 5. In the second step, multiple regression analysis was performed (Cohen & Cohen, 1975). Using this technique, both the main effects for the overall model (paternalism, career-development system)
and the unique effect of paternalism on the dependent variables after
partialing out the contribution of the formal career-development system were determined. The results of these analyses were used to test
Hypothesis 6.
Results
The results of the correlational analysis are presented in Table 1. The
positive and significant relationships among belief in company paternalism and the career-relevant criterion variables indicate that belief in company paternalism is related to the activities expected to be engaged in by
right types of Japanese workers. Specifically, belief in company paternalism is positively related to hidden-investment processes in Japanese
organizations, including self-investment activities (r = .20, p < .001) and
investments by supervisors (r =.23, p < .001). Moreover, company paternalism is positively related to the quality of LMX (r = .27, p < .001), indicating that Hi-Pats are more involved in high-quality LMX relationships
than their Lo-Pat co-workers. In addition to informal career-development
processes, belief in company paternalism is also positively related to formal career-investment processes (CDS; r = .42, p < .001) and to overall
job satisfaction (r = .33, p < .001). Although not specifically hypothesized,
findings also demonstrate a positive relationship between hidden-investment activities and reported favorability of the formal career-development system (CDS and self-investment: r = .19, p < .001; CDS and supervisor investment: r = .26, p <. 001) and quality of LMX and reported
favorability of the formal career-development system (CDS and LMX: r =
.31, p < .001).
The correlational analyses also illustrate the relationships among the
dependent variables. Not surprisingly, these criterion variables are positively related. Because they combine to form an overall system of career
development, it was expected that these processes would be interrelated.
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Table 1. Product-Moment Correlations among Predictors and Criteria (N = 1,075)
Variable

1

2

1. Paternalism

[.70]

3

4

5

6

2. Career-development
system

.42

[.90]

3. Self-investment

.20

.19

[.92]

4. Supervisor investment

.23

.26

.51

[.95]

5. Leader-member
exchange

.27

.31

.50

.71

[.89]

6. Job satisfaction

.33

.28

.50

.50

.50

[.78]

All correlations are significant beyond the .001 level. Numbers in brackets represent reliability coefficients.

In particular, supervisor investment and self-investment, both activities
that require subordinates to grow out of their jobs and engage in additional developmental opportunities, are positively related (r = .51, p <
.001). These measures are different, however, in that supervisor investments are behaviors performed by the supervisor, whereas self-investment activities are behaviors performed by the subordinate. Similarly,
quality of the LMX relationship and supervisor investment are positively
correlated (r = .71, p < .001). Again, these measures are different in that
LMX measures the quality of the exchange relationship and supervisor
investment measures the supervisor-investment activities associated with
these exchange relationships.
Table 2 shows the results of the multiple regression analyses. These
findings provide support for the sixth hypothesis. In particular, even
after the contribution of the formal career-development system is removed, belief in company paternalism makes a significant contribution
in explaining variance in the dependent variables (Fs range from 20.89
to 67.74, all significant at the .001 level). These findings indicate that regardless of the effect of formal career investments, Hi-Pat workers are
more involved in hidden-investment processes within Japanese organizations (self-investment: F = 20.89, p < .001; supervisor investment: F
= 22.86, p < .001). Thus this test of the hidden-investment model demonstrates that even after the effect of formal career investments is removed, belief in company paternalism is positively related to hiddeninvestment activities.
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Table 2. Regression Analysis of the Unique Contribution of Paternalism (N =
1,075)

Measure

Unique Effect of Paternalism
Paternalism
F

Self-investment activities

20.89*

Supervisor investment

22.86*

Leader-member exchange

29.12*

Job satisfaction

67.74*

Unique effect of paternalism is the unique effect of paternalism after effects of CDS are partialed out.
* p < .001

Discussion
The findings of the present study provide support for the hypotheses that belief in company paternalism is positively related to enhanced
career-development activities among line managers in Japanese organizations. Hi-Pat line managers reported greater participation in both formal and informal career-investment processes, greater involvement in
the development of high-quality leader-member exchange relationships,
and increased overall satisfaction with their job situation. Moreover, the
contribution of strong beliefs in company paternalism to the hidden-investment process extends beyond the effect of the formal career-development system. This is an important finding, for it suggests that regardless
of the favorability of treatment received by the formal career-development system, Hi-Pat line managers engage in more hidden-investment
activities than do their Lo-Pat counterparts. Because Hi-Pat workers reported greater compatibility with the career-development systems in Japanese corporations, it appears that these workers are the right types for
Japanese organizations.
Further support for the classification of Hi-Pats as the right type for
Japanese organizations is provided by findings of the Japanese career
progress studies concerning the contribution of high-quality leadermember exchanges to enhanced career progress within Japanese organizations (Wakabayashi & Graen, 1984; Wakabayashi et al., 1988; Graen et
al., 1990). In these studies, establishment of high-quality exchange rela-
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tionships was found to predict career progress of Japanese line managers
over the 13 years in which they were followed (Wakabayashi et a]., 1988).
Moreover, LMX was found to be more predictive of Japanese career progress than the assessment center model (Bray & Grant, 1986; Bray, Campbell, & Grant, 1974) and the organizational-commitment model (Porter,
Crampton, & Smith, 1976). Thus, because high-LMX relationships have
been found to contribute to career progress in Japanese organizations,
and the present investigation demonstrated a positive relationship between strong beliefs in company paternalism and the establishment of
high-quality LMX relationships, it is reasonable to assume that belief in
company paternalism is also instrumental to enhanced career progress
within Japanese organizations.
The greater involvement of Hi-Pat line managers in hidden-investment processes, both self-investments and supervisor investments, also
indicates that these right-type managers are receiving more from the system than their Lo-Pat counterparts. The increased developmental opportunities in which they are participating better prepare them for advancement through the organizational hierarchy. As discussed earlier,
enhanced informal investments may also allow these managers to receive
more favorable treatment from the formal career-development system.
Findings in the present study indicating a positive relationship between
the formal career-development system and hidden-investment activities
are again supportive of this proposition.
Finally, the unique contribution of paternalism to the hidden-investment process after controlling for the contribution of the formal careerdevelopment system strengthens our conclusion that we have truly found
a career-investment process that is hidden—a process that occurs both informally and over and above formal career-investment processes. By providing a vehicle through which line managers may take a more proactive
role in their career development, these hidden-investment activities allow right types of Japanese line managers to differentiate themselves effectively from non-right types and thus extract more efficacious career investments within their organizations.
In addition to these findings, the results of the current study suggest a
question of relevance to American companies: What is the American analogue of company paternalism? One reasonable candidate for the right
type in American corporations is Hackman and Oldham’s (1976) concept
of “growth needs.” According to Hackman and Oldham, growth needs
are operationally defined by the Growth Need Strength (GNS) instrument as the preference for work itself (intrinsic to the work), job opportunities, and outcomes over nonwork itself (extrinsic to the work). Studies
by Graen and his associates (Graen et al., 1982; Graen, Scandura, & Graen,
1986; Graen, 1989, 1990) show that high-GNS people more readily accept
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the challenges of higher quality LMX relationships and respond with improved productivity than do low- or moderate-GNS people. Therefore,
high-GNS people are more likely to make greater personal investments
in their careers and receive greater investments, both formal and informal, from their bosses than are their lower-GNS colleagues.
A similarity between Hi-Pats in Japanese companies and high GNSs
in American companies is worthy of note. Although the Hi-Pats commit
themselves to their companies and strive to add value in their work for
the benefit of something to which they deeply identify (their company),
the high GNSs commit and endeavor to enhance the value of something
to which they deeply identify (their work). Thus both find something beyond their own self-interests to justify their dedication. We may speculate that this additional job investment may be characteristic of most corporate right types.
A practical implication of this study is that it emphasizes the importance of matching potential employees with their particular company
cultures. In addition, these companies should attempt to design careerdevelopment systems that will maximize the contribution of their right
types. Every company has its own culture, which must be understood before it can be harnessed to make it more productive. Unfortunately, many
companies expend greater effort denying their cultures and their right
types than capitalizing on them for the good of their competitive positions in their markets. This is a lesson that we must learn from our international competitors-we need to make our own unique hidden systems
work for our companies.
Note
1. The sample consisted of line managers from various hierarchical levels throughout the
organization. To ensure that these levels were not influencing the findings, an additional
analysis was conducted that tested for these effects across each hierarchical level. The results of these analyses indicated that there were no differences by job level and that the
findings held regardless of hierarchical status within the organization.
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